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Abstract. Separate Austrian influences, those of Bolzano and Brentano, came together in the work 
of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov–Warsaw School and Polish analytic 
philosophy. From Bolzano he took the ideas of abstract content and absolute truth; from Brentano 
the centrality of intentionality and the role of psychology, and from both an awareness of the 
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doctrines, attitudes and practices of that School, from its origins in 1895 to its continuation in 
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1. Prelude: The Geopolitics of Central – Eastern Europe
Near the Polish city of Mysłowice, south-east of Katowice in Silesia, two small 
rivers flow together: the Black Przemsza from the north-west, and the White 
Przemsza from the north-east, forming the Przemsza, a short tributary of 
Poland’s main river, the Vistula. The confluence of the two tributaries of the 
Przemsza was, from 1871 to 1914, a geopolitical tripoint, where three empires 
met: the German Empire to the west, the Russian Empire to the north, and the 
Austro-Hungarian empire to the east, and it became known as Three Emperors’ 
Corner, Dreikaisereck, Trójkąt Trzech Cesarzy, Уголтрёхимператоров. I am 
using the flowing together, or confluence, of streams of water to form a new 
stream as a metaphor for the bringing together of two streams of thought to form
a new stream, combining aspects of the two. The Dreikaisereck represents three 
of the polities figuring in my story: Germany, Austria, and Poland. I shall be 
talking about three philosophers: the German Franz Brentano, the Austrian, 
(Bohemian) Bernard Bolzano, and the Pole, Kazimierz Twardowski. 
Twardowski’s is the mind bringing together the influences of Bolzano and 
Brentano and originating a new and powerful stream of Polish thought, which 
flowed metaphorically into the Vistula in Warsaw and became one of the chief 
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intellectual movements of the inter-war period, a veritable Golden Age of Polish 
science and letters: the Lvov–Warsaw School. 
The story begins in 1866, in Vienna, where Kazimierz Twardowski was born to 
Polish parents. He attended Vienna University where he studied philosophy with 
Franz Brentano and Robert Zimmermann. In 1891 he obtained his doctorate 
with a dissertation Idea and Perception in Descartes. His breakthrough work 
was his 1894 Habilitation dissertation Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der 
Vorstellungen, On the Theory of the Content and Object of Presentations 
(hereafter: IGV).1 On the strength of this work, he was appointed as associate 
professor (professor extraordinarius) at the University of Lwów (German: 
Lemberg), then in the Austrian province of Galicia, later in the second Republic 
of Poland, from 1945 to 1991 in the Soviet Union, and now as L’viv the chief 
city of western Ukraine. Twardowski’s appointment was internal to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire: when Poland regained her independence, his citizenship and 
employment changed with it, and he taught in Lwów almost until his death in 
1938.
Under the relatively mild conditions of Austrian occupation, instruction in the 
two ancient Polish universities at Kraków and Lwów was in Polish. This 
contrasted with the extreme suppression of Polish culture in the German and 
Russian parts of the former Kingdom of Poland. So it was that Austrian 
influences could pass easily into Polish thought and form the basis for the Polish 
intellectual explosion of the interwar years. Lwów was the younger of the two 
universities, founded in 1661 by King Jan II Kazimierz, whose name it bore 
from 1919–1939.  
2. Vienna, Brentano, Zimmermann
Twardowski’s philosophical mentors in Vienna were Robert Zimmermann
(1824–1898) and Franz Brentano (1838–1917). The latter is by far the better 
known so we start with him. 
Franz Brentano came from the German Rhineland and studied and then taught in 
Germany, but from 1874–1895 he taught philosophy at the University of Vienna, 
inspiring a superbly talented array of students including Tomáš Garrigue 
Masaryk, Alexius Meinong, Edmund Husserl, Christian von Ehrenfels, Sigmund 
Freud and others. His lectures on ethics were famous and attracted huge numbers 
of students. More famous still was the scandal of Brentano’s loss of his 
professorship. In 1880 he had married the daughter of a Jewish banker, an act 
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which for him as a former priest was thought by some to be against Austrian 
law. To safeguard against possible legal proceedings, Brentano had resigned his 
professorship and married in Saxony. The expected reinstatement to his chair 
never came about, as his action had displeased the conservative Emperor Franz 
Josef, so from 1880–1895 he taught in Vienna as a mere unsalaried 
Privatdozent, unable to supervise dissertations. So it came about that 
Twardowski, while strongly influenced by Brentano’s messianic vision of a new 
scientific rigorous philosophy based on psychology, had Brentano’s senior 
colleague Zimmermann as supervisor.  
Robert Zimmermann came from Prague. As a young boy, he had been 
a particular favourite of his father’s friend Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848), the 
greatest of 19th century philosophers. Bolzano, who himself had suffered the loss 
of both his Prague chair and his priestly offices through the reactionary actions 
of church and state in Metternich’s Austria, was particularly concerned to find 
someone able to appreciate and pass on his revolutionary views in logic and 
mathematics, and he adopted the young Robert as his intellectual heir, entrusting 
him with the manuscript of his incomplete final work on the foundations of 
mathematics, the Grössenlehre. Unfortunately for Bolzano, Zimmermann was 
more interested in philosophy than in mathematics, and more unfortunately still, 
he soon lost sympathy for Bolzano’s rigorous logical platonism and preferred the 
lesser philosophy of Johann Friedrich Herbart. As a result, he did nothing with 
Bolzano’s papers until 1882 when he simply gave them to the Austrian 
Academy of Sciences. This inaction resulted in a further generation’s delay in 
the reception of Bolzano’s work, which only gradually came to the interest of 
a small coterie of philosophers, including Alois Höfler in Vienna and Edmund 
Husserl in Germany, in the 1890s. In 1853 Zimmermann had published 
a textbook of logic and philosophy for secondary school children,2 based on the 
ideas of Bolzano’s great Wissenschaftslehre, but without attribution (this was 
with Bolzano’s approval). But a second edition of 1860 replaced Bolzano’s clear 
ideas by Herbart’s less clear ones, and that was almost the end of Bolzano’s 
influence for more than thirty years.
However, as supervisor of Twardowski, it is very likely that Zimmermann told 
Twardowski about Bolzano’s theory of ideas and propositions in themselves. 
Another possible source of Twardowski’s acquaintance with Bolzano’s thought 
was Alois Höfler, teaching in Vienna and interested in Bolzano. Certainly 
nowhere else in the world was as cognizant of Bolzano as the philosophy 
department in 1890s Vienna, so it was fortunate for posterity and for Polish 
thought that Twardowski studied there. 
2 ZIMMERMANN [1853].
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3. Intentionality
Brentano’s rightly most famous contribution to philosophy was his 
reintroduction, in his opus magnum Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint3,
of the ancient and medieval doctrine of the intentional inexistence of objects of 
consciousness. The Psychology, which secured Brentano’s professorship in 
Vienna, but whose first publication contained only two out of six projected parts 
(“books”), developed out of Brentano’s study of Aristotle and the Scholastics, 
but also of the British empiricists and their founding of philosophy on the theory 
of the human mind. Brentano sought a criterion for distinguishing the subject 
matter of the mental science of psychology from the physical sciences, since he 
denied the then popular view that psychology was reducible to physiology. 
Method alone could not distinguish one science from another, since Brentano 
held that, with the exception of the a priori science of mathematics, all sciences, 
including philosophy, share the same method. Therefore, if psychology was to 
be an autonomous science, it had to be distinguished by its subject matter, what 
Brentano called mental phenomena.
Among several contenders for a distinguishing mark of mental phenomena as 
distinct from physical phenomena, Brentano selected what he called intentional 
inexistence. An idea, a judgement, an emotion, a desire, are all of something: 
they have what we can call “aboutness”. I see a tree, I judge that its leaves are 
green, I like the flowers under the tree, and I want to lie down in its shade. By 
contrast, the tree, the leaves, the flowers, the shade, have no “aboutness”: they 
are not of anything; they just are. So they are physical phenomena, while my 
idea, judgement etc. are mental phenomena. All mental phenomena have this 
aboutness or of-ness, no physical phenomenon has.  
This feature is present in Aristotle’s theory of perception in De Anima: when 
I perceive a tree, the form of Tree is present in my soul, but minus the matter 
that helps to make a real tree. Because of the general mistrust of metaphysics at 
this time, Brentano prefers to speak not of the soul but of mental acts, and 
influenced by Descartes and Comte, he prefers not to commit himself to the 
existence of an independent physical reality. The aboutness of a mental act is 
therefore modelled on the relation of whole to part. The object of a mental act is 
immanent in or part of the act itself. So the tree-I-see is not an external physical 
thing but a part of my seeing. This justifies the term ‘inexistence’: the tree-I-see 
exists as a physical phenomenon in the seeing of the tree as a mental 
phenomenon. Discussion of the several varieties of this inexistence are what 
forms the bulk of Brentano’s Psychology. 
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The nature of inexistence led Brentano to use as near-synonyms several different 
terms for that which a mental act is about: object, content, immanent objectivity. 
Brentano’s defence of the autonomy of psychology and his selection of
intentionality as the mark of its subject matter were to influence both empirical 
psychology and phenomenology. But the instability and potential scepticism of 
the inexistence doctrine led to dissatisfaction among Brentano’s students. In 
1890, Höfler and Meinong published a school logic and psychology textbook4
(replacing that of Zimmermann) in which they distinguished between an 
immanent or mental object on the one hand, and an external object on the other. 
This distinction and its terminological anchoring was to be the subject of IGV,
Twardowski’s Habilitationsschrift.
4. Ideas
In German, the standard term for the Cartesian – Lockean concept of idea is 
Vorstellung. The term Idee does occur, but less often (Twardowski used it in his 
dissertation on Descartes.) The word Vorstellung was introduced into German 
philosophical terminology by Christian Wolff as the German equivalent of the 
Latin words idea and repraesentatio.5 It is a regular German word with many 
meanings, it comes from the idea of putting (stellen) something before (vor)
something or somebody. Generally, it was used where philosophers writing in 
Latin, French or English would use ‘idea’ or ‘idée’. It has the disadvantage of 
being long, and of being variously translatable, giving rise to a rather pointless 
discussion in English translations of Kant, Schopenhauer and other Germans 
about whether ‘idea’, ‘presentation’ or ‘representation’ is the best rendering. On 
the other hand, it comes from a verb ‘(sich etwas) vorstellen’, so that the verbs 
‘present’ and ‘represent’ can be used, whereas the verb ‘ideate’ is extremely 
unnatural and can also have other meanings. I use ‘present’ for vorstellen, the 
verb, and ‘idea’ for Vorstellung, the noun.
5. Content and Object of Ideas
Twardowski’s little book on the content and object of ideas was and is a classic. 
It is barely a hundred pages long, yet with a clarity and succinctness practically 
unknown in German-language philosophy it made the case for a clear distinction 
between an immanent, mental aspect of presenting, and a transcendent target of 
the presenting. The former Twardowski called Inhalt, the ‘content’, the latter 
4 HÖFLER and MEINONG [1890].
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Gegenstand, the ‘object’, of the idea. Twardowski thus exploited the 
terminological redundancy in Brentano to anchor the distinction. The book had 
immediate influence on others of Brentano’s former students, in particular 
Meinong and Husserl, who went on to develop their own (differing) versions of 
the content–object distinction. 
The arguments Twardowski uses to make the distinction are easy to summarize. 
They come in Section 6. If I think of something that does not exist, such as the 
god Zeus, then while Zeus does not exist, the content representing him does. So 
they cannot be the same. Content and object cannot be the same because they 
often have different properties and stand in different relations. The number 4 is 
divisible by 2, but the content presenting the number 4 is not divisible by any 
number. A mountain is extended and rocky, but the content presenting it is 
neither. Finally, different contents may present the same object. The content the 
city on the site of the Roman Juvavum is a different content from the birthplace 
of Mozart, but both present the same object, Salzburg. Such examples and 
arguments are commonplace today, though they are more often recounted in 
connection with Frege’s distinction between the sense and reference of 
expressions. Twardowski’s psychological distinction is indeed closely analogous 
to Frege’s linguistic one.
6. Two Kinds of Content
When he introduces the content/object distinction, Twardowski quotes Höfler 
with approval, where it is stated: 
What we call ‘the content of an idea and a judgement’ lies just as completely within 
the subject as the act of presenting or judging itself.6
This makes the content of an idea something mental, and therewith something in 
time, if not (according to views then prevalent) in space. For this reason, I can 
think of something that does not exist at the same time as my thinking of it, or 
does not exist in space and time, or does not exist at all, but all the contents are 
in time and can be given a date. This conception of content as something 
immanent and mental is in accord with Brentano, and is the view adopted later 
by Meinong.  
A little later in his monograph, however, Twardowski talks about naming and 
meaning. He notes that names and ideas are closely correlated with one another. 
When we name something, he says, we do three things: we indicate or express 
that we are presenting something; we intend to arouse in listeners a presentation 
with the same content; and we name, designate or refer to something. When I 
6 TWARDOWSKI [1894], p. 4; HÖFLER and MEINONG [1890], § 6.
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said ‘the same content’, this can be understood in two different ways. Someone 
other than myself cannot have the same content if we are two different people 
and ‘content’ refers to something mental, since my content and theirs have to be 
distinct. In that case, what ‘the same’ means must be something like ‘the same in 
kind’ or ‘similar’. On the other hand, if ‘the same’ means ‘identical’ then my 
content and someone else’s can be the same, but then content cannot be 
something mental, but must be something abstract, which two or more people 
can share in common. Twardowski’s use of ‘the same content’ in connection 
with naming in fact tends rather to support this second reading, of content as 
something abstract, since he equates the content I and my hearer have in mind 
when I use a name with the name’s meaning, and that is something abstract: 
“This content is that which is understood by the “meaning” (Bedeutung) of 
a name.”7
This uncertainty in the status of content (mental versus abstract) is I think not 
accidental: it derives from Twardowski’s two principal sources: Brentano and 
Bolzano. 
7. Bolzano on Ideas
In IGV, two philosophers are mentioned more often than any others, and each is 
mentioned as often as the other. They are Brentano and Bolzano. The frequency 
of mentions of Brentano is unsurprising, since he taught and influenced 
Twardowski directly. That of Bolzano is more surprising. We already mentioned 
the likely sources, namely Zimmermann and Höfler. But Twardowski does not 
just refer to Bolzano, he employs (and criticises) his philosophy. Section 5 of 
Twardowski’s work is entitled “So-called ‘objectless’ ideas.” He quotes 
Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre,8 where Bolzano upholds the claim that there are 
ideas which have no objects. As examples, Bolzano gives ‘nothing’, ‘round 
square’, ‘green virtue’ and ‘golden mountain’. Students of Meinong will 
recognize some of these as familiar. Twardowski rightly objects against Bolzano 
that ‘nothing’ is a syncategorematic term, not in the business of presenting 
objects, but against the other three cases he argues quite fallaciously that 
Bolzano confuses not having an object with not being presented. Indeed, one of 
Twardowski’s chief theses in IGV is that all ideas have objects, even in those 
cases where the object does not exist. This was the view taken up and made 
famous, indeed notorious, by Meinong. 
Twardowski’s acceptance of non-existent objects is not germane to our point, 
however. What is important for us here is rather that he quotes Bolzano’s 
7 TWARDOWSKI [1894], p. 11. 
8 BOLZANO [1837]. 
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6 TWARDOWSKI [1894], p. 4; HÖFLER and MEINONG [1890], § 6.
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said ‘the same content’, this can be understood in two different ways. Someone 
other than myself cannot have the same content if we are two different people 
and ‘content’ refers to something mental, since my content and theirs have to be 
distinct. In that case, what ‘the same’ means must be something like ‘the same in 
kind’ or ‘similar’. On the other hand, if ‘the same’ means ‘identical’ then my 
content and someone else’s can be the same, but then content cannot be 
something mental, but must be something abstract, which two or more people 
can share in common. Twardowski’s use of ‘the same content’ in connection 
with naming in fact tends rather to support this second reading, of content as 
something abstract, since he equates the content I and my hearer have in mind 
when I use a name with the name’s meaning, and that is something abstract: 
“This content is that which is understood by the “meaning” (Bedeutung) of 
a name.”7
This uncertainty in the status of content (mental versus abstract) is I think not 
accidental: it derives from Twardowski’s two principal sources: Brentano and 
Bolzano. 
7. Bolzano on Ideas
In IGV, two philosophers are mentioned more often than any others, and each is 
mentioned as often as the other. They are Brentano and Bolzano. The frequency 
of mentions of Brentano is unsurprising, since he taught and influenced 
Twardowski directly. That of Bolzano is more surprising. We already mentioned 
the likely sources, namely Zimmermann and Höfler. But Twardowski does not 
just refer to Bolzano, he employs (and criticises) his philosophy. Section 5 of 
Twardowski’s work is entitled “So-called ‘objectless’ ideas.” He quotes 
Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre,8 where Bolzano upholds the claim that there are 
ideas which have no objects. As examples, Bolzano gives ‘nothing’, ‘round 
square’, ‘green virtue’ and ‘golden mountain’. Students of Meinong will 
recognize some of these as familiar. Twardowski rightly objects against Bolzano 
that ‘nothing’ is a syncategorematic term, not in the business of presenting 
objects, but against the other three cases he argues quite fallaciously that 
Bolzano confuses not having an object with not being presented. Indeed, one of 
Twardowski’s chief theses in IGV is that all ideas have objects, even in those 
cases where the object does not exist. This was the view taken up and made 
famous, indeed notorious, by Meinong. 
Twardowski’s acceptance of non-existent objects is not germane to our point, 
however. What is important for us here is rather that he quotes Bolzano’s 
7 TWARDOWSKI [1894], p. 11. 
8 BOLZANO [1837]. 
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Wissenschaftslehre at a time when no one else was doing so. Indeed, he notes 
with approval in Section 4 that Bolzano makes and maintains a clear distinction 
between the content of an idea, what he (Bolzano) calls ‘objective idea’ or ‘idea 
in itself’ (Vorstellung an sich) and the object or objects (if any) of the idea. 
Bolzano’s robust platonist theory of ideas and propositions in themselves (Sätze 
an sich) is indeed the first feature of his logic reform that catches one’s attention. 
It is insisted upon by him as the key that unlocks the whole panoply of rigorous 
logical conceptions. Bolzano distinguishes, in particular, between ideas as 
something mental, subjective ideas, and ideas in themselves, or objective ideas, 
and he calls the objective ideas the contents of subjective ideas and the meanings
of linguistic terms. As a logician, Bolzano dwells far less than does Twardowski 
on the subjective or mental aspect, but the relationship is exactly as Twardow- 
ski says. Bolzano, like Frege after him, speaks of the individual subject grasping 
(erfassen) objective ideas and propositions. So to the extent that Twardowski is 
using Bolzano’s conception of ideas in themselves as contents, he is using the 
abstract rather than the mental concept of content. In the context of his approval 
of Bolzano, Twardowski also approvingly quotes Zimmermann, who likewise 
emphasizes the distinction, and in addition the much younger Benno Kerry, 
another Brentano student from Vienna whose work on logic and mathematics 
famously came to the attention of Frege. The juxtaposition of the quotes from 
Bolzano and Zimmermann makes it plausible that it was Zimmermann who 
brought Bolzano’s discussion to Twardowski’s attention.
The first and perhaps most important way in which the initially very distinct 
streams of thought on ideas, coming from Brentano on the one hand, and 
Bolzano on the other, flow together is in the work of Twardowski on the content 
of ideas. The ambiguity or indecision of Twardowski’s conception as to whether 
contents are mental or abstract can indeed be taken as an implicit mark of the 
divergent origins of his conception. Of course, it is perfectly possible to 
reconcile the two conceptions, as Husserl was to do a little later in his Logical 
Investigations, by saying that an abstract content is the ideal type or species of 
which the mental contents are instances.  
8. Truth
In his middle years, Brentano held to a somewhat tentative correspondence 
theory of truth, though he later repudiated it in favour of an evidence theory. 
Bolzano, on the other hand, had a very straightforward and, indeed, rather 
deflationary conception of truth. A proposition (henceforth I drop the ‘in itself’) 
of the form A has b is true if and only if every object falling under the subject 
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term A has some attribute falling under the predicate term b.9 For example, the 
proposition [Snow is white], in its canonical form [Snow has whiteness], is true 
if and only if every batch of snow has some type of whiteness. This is, 
appearances to the contrary, a general definition of truth, since Bolzano held that 
all propositions, no matter how expressed linguistically, can be put into an 
equivalent subject–predicate form A has b, where A is any term and b is a term 
denoting an abstract attribute. It is clear from Bolzano’s account that no 
proposition is true at one time and false at another: propositions are out of time 
and so are either true, period, or false, period. If a form of words, such as 
‘Socrates is sitting’ or ‘I am tired’, expresses something true at one time and 
something false at another, then the different occurrences of the form of words 
in question express different propositions.
The idea that truth is thus absolute, and not relative to time, place, speaker or 
other circumstance, is one which Twardowski upheld and defended vigorously 
in a paper of 1900 with the title ‘O tzw. prawdach względnych’, ‘On so-called 
relative truths’, translated into German in 1902 as ‘Über sogenannte relative 
Wahrheiten’.10 In the paper, Twardowski upheld the view, consonant with that of 
Bolzano, and perhaps even inspired by him, that appearances to the effect that a 
proposition could change its truth value stemmed from elliptical uses of 
language, in which aspects of the circumstances of utterance of a sentence are 
exploited to make it unnecessary in the context pedantically to spell out all the 
features that would pin down a unique proposition as the meaning of 
the sentence.11 The importance of Twardowski’s defence of absolute truth, then 
almost certainly a minority view, for the subsequent development of philosophy 
and logic in Poland, is considerable.12
9. The Lwów School, 1895–1939
On arriving in the Polish-speaking University of Lwów in 1895, Twardowski 
found Polish philosophy in a lamentably backward state by comparison with that 
of Vienna, then at the forefront of philosophical developments. He therefore set 
about transforming philosophical life, by his teaching, by reforms of the way in 
which philosophy was examined, and by the professional institutions supporting 
philosophy. He was tirelessly energetic in introducing and implementing these 
reforms, all of which were aimed at improving the standards of philosophy in his 
part of Polish-speaking Europe. The price he paid for this organisatory and 
reforming activity was that his own aspirations to be a researcher in philosophy, 
9 BOLZANO [1935], p. 90. 
10 TWARDOWSKI [1900].
11 See SIMONS [2009].
12 See WOLEŃSKI and SIMONS 1989.
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9 BOLZANO [1935], p. 90. 
10 TWARDOWSKI [1900].
11 See SIMONS [2009].
12 See WOLEŃSKI and SIMONS 1989.
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publishing books and papers and gaining international recognition, had to be 
drastically curtailed. His energies went into producing the next generation of 
philosophers writing in Polish rather than into a large philosophical output of his 
own. His lectures, on the model of his teacher Brentano, were extremely clear 
and likewise extremely popular. Like his older colleague Meinong, whose 
advice he sought on the matter, he set up a laboratory of experimental 
psychology, and trained two generations of Polish psychologists. His rewards 
were not wide personal fame, of which he was certainly capable, but rather the 
satisfaction over the next four decades of seeing an immeasurable improvement 
in standards, and his own students coming to occupy a significant proportion of 
the chairs of Philosophy and Psychology in the independent Poland of 1919–39. 
Another achievement, for which Twardowski’s own views as well as the 
generally liberal and progressive environment of Polish intellectual life 
were jointly responsible, was that a significant number of his students and pupils 
were female. Twardowski’s advanced seminars contained in some cases 
a majority of women, at a time when female emancipation was making slower 
progress elsewhere.13
In the course of time, Twardowski attracted the brightest and best minds from all 
parts of the Polish-speaking world to study with him in Lwów. The first to make 
an independent name for himself was Jan Łukasiewicz, himself a native of the 
city, whose interests were in the methodology of science, logic, and the history 
of philosophy. Twardowski and Łukasiewicz indeed jointly translated David 
Hume’s first Enquiry into Polish. The first lectures Twardowski gave in Lwów 
were on the reforms being made in elementary logic, a topic taking some ideas 
from Brentano but also looking at developments in Britain and France. 
Łukasiewicz took up this line of thought and very quickly advanced beyond 
Twardowski’s rather rudimentary skills in logic. Łukasiewicz read and 
commented on Aristotle as well as Jevons, but he also read Bolzano, Frege 
and Russell, and visited Meinong in Graz, at a time when both were working on 
the logic of probability. Łukasiewicz’s 1910 mongraph On the Principle of 
Contradiction in Aristotle was already questioning the orthodoxy of entrenched 
logical principles, and this questioning attitude came to fruition during the Great 
War when Łukasiewicz, newly appointed to the reopened University of Warsaw, 
developed his most significant idea, that of many-valued logic. It was 
Łukasiewicz who brought the Lwów School into closer appreciation of the 
logical ideas of Frege, Russell, Couturat and Peirce. But Łukasiewicz also knew 
his Bolzano. His 1913 monograph on the logical foundations of probability 
theory, written and published in German, compared his own logical theory of 
probability with similar ideas of Bolzano. Łukasiewicz’s clarity of style 
surpassed even that of his teacher, as indeed that of all other Polish philosophers 
13 SIMONS [forthcoming].
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and logicians. Though under the influence of Frege and Husserl he came to 
reject any admixture of psychology in logic, and replaced psychological terms 
such as sąd, judgement, and przedstawienie, idea, by linguistic ones such as 
zdanie, sentence, and nazwa, name, Łukasiewicz always remained respectful 
towards Twardowski. 
Soon other talented students came to Lwów to study with Twardowski, among 
them Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, 
Tadeusz Czeżowski, Wladysław Witwicki, Roman Ingarden and Stanisław 
Leśniewski. Before the Great War they already formed a circle who discussed 
and published their ideas in Polish and who interacted with their teacher and 
amongst themselves. Leśniewski, Czeżowski and Ajdukiewicz were interested in 
logical problems; Ajdukiewicz and Kotarbiński in general philosophy and 
methodology, Tatarkiewicz in aesthetics and the history of philosophy, Ingarden 
in phenomenology and ontology, and Witwicki in psychology. When Poland 
regained her independence they spread out and populated her new or newly 
reopened universities in Warsaw, Vilnius and Kraków. Twardowski continued to 
teach in Lwów, and while his later students such as Leopold Blaustein, Daniela 
Gromska and Izydora Dąmbska did not attain the international standing of the 
earlier generation, they continued the high standards of their predecessors. 
10. The New Centre of Gravity: Warsaw
When Łukasiewicz and then Leśniewski were both appointed Professors at 
Warsaw University after the Great War, that city and university could boast two 
more professors of mathematical logic than anywhere else on the planet. They 
were soon joined by a once-in-a-generation genius, Alfred Tarski (né
Tajtelbaum), who studied mathematics as well as philosophy and went on to 
become the most prominent of Polish logicians. These three between them raised 
a generation of outstanding logical talent, the concentration of which has never 
been seen before or since. Twardowski was somewhat dismayed by their 
obsession with logical detail at the expense of sound common sense, but 
remained on relatively cordial terms with all of them, except perhaps 
Leśniewski, whose idiosyncratic and intolerant character led to his eventually 
falling out with everyone except his close friend Kotarbiński.
The 1920s were a period of establishment and consolidation of the new logical 
approach to philosophy, the writing of Polish textbooks and the anchoring of 
new institutions, for which the pre-existing Austrian universities in Lwów and 
Kraków served as a clear basis. The 1930s saw the newly self-confident Poles 
reaching out to cognate movements of scientific philosophy in Austria (the 
Vienna Circle), Germany (the Berlin Group), Britain, France, Scandinavia and 
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Czechoslovakia. International congresses and exchanges with such rising talents 
as Kurt Gödel, Rudolf Carnap, W. V. Quine and Karl Popper, as well as loose 
participation in the Unity of Science movement, brought Polish philosophy and 
logic into the mainstream of European analytic thought. Łukasiewicz found 
a kindred spirit in the first German professor of mathematical logic, Heinrich 
Scholz, and indeed fled Poland to Münster and Scholz during World War II. It 
was Scholz, a trained historian of philosophy, who first pointed out the striking 
similarity between Tarski’s 1936 definition of logical consequence and the 
definition of logische Ableitbarkeit given by Bolzano in 1837. Tarski’s own 
attendance at a Unity of Science meeting at Harvard in 1939 literally saved his 
life, as he would almost certainly have ended his days in a Nazi death camp, as 
did most of his Jewish compatriots. Tarski’s friend and collaborator Adolf 
Lindenbaum, and his wife Janina Hosiasson (original author of the Raven 
Paradox of confirmation14) did indeed meet such a fate in 1942. In the unstable 
atmosphere of Summer 1939, Hosiasson had failed, by only days, to obtain 
a visa to depart on the same ship as Tarski to the USA.
The emphasis on logic in Warsaw was driven in part by the interests of the main 
actors there, but also in part by the rare collaboration with the Warsaw 
mathematicians, who understood that it was necessary to specialize in new 
subjects such as logic, set theory and topology, in order to avoid competing with 
the established mathematical nations of Germany, France and Britain in areas 
such as analysis and algebra. The result was to bring Polish philosophy 
somewhat closer to its Bohemian roots in Bolzano, whose combination of 
mathematical and philosophical talents was echoed among the Poles. The 
obsession with truth that had characterized Polish thinking before World War I 
continued, with essays by Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński and Łukasiewicz feeding 
into the supreme achievement in this genre, Tarski’s 1933 monograph The 
Concept of Truth in the Languages of the Deductive Sciences, translated into 
German in 1935 by Leopold Blaustein.15 Tarski’s paper, technically masterful 
despite its limited philosophical scope, embodied Twardowski’s conception of 
absolute truth in a new mathematically formulated way, continuing the influence 
of Twardowski’s student and Tarski’s teacher Leśniewski. Among the logicians, 
the only one to move slightly away Twardowski’s notion of absolute truth was 
Łukasiewicz, whose three-valued logic envisaged propositions dealing with the 
future either changing their truth value from merely possible to true or false, 
depending on what contingently happened, or else being intrinsically tensed. 
14 HOSIASSON-LINDENBAUM, J. [1940].
15 TARSKI [1933]. We now know, following investigation by Jan Woleński, that Twardowski 
materially assisted Tarski in getting Blaustein as translator, advising on the translation, and in 
smoothing the way to publication in German.
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While the pre-eminence of Warsaw between the wars led to a restrained rivalry 
with the source in Lwów, and Twardowski no doubt felt himself somewhat 
upstaged by his younger colleagues, the flow of talent from those two centres 
continued and spread to other universities. Twardowski’s greater emphasis on 
psychology led to his having a similar dominating influence on Polish 
psychology to that which he had exercised on Polish philosophy. He never 
completely gave up his view that psychology has a prominent role for 
philosophy, though his later writings also recognise the importance of logical 
and linguistic considerations, as indeed they had from the start.  
11. The Virtues of Polish Analytic Philosophy
While they never subscribed to the label ‘analytic’ – there was no need to do so 
as they had no serious rivals from whom to distinguish themselves – Polish 
philosophers of the Lvov–Warsaw School were closest in spirit to the broad 
movement we now know as ‘analytic philosophy’, whose origins, whether in 
Prague, Jena or Cambridge, produced work with which theirs could compete on 
equal and similar terms. The historical Bildung of the school’s founder was 
transmitted to the students, so that while, under the influence of Brentano and 
later of Frege and Russell, it was felt that Polish philosophy and logic were 
solidly scientific, modern and innovative, there was never any ignorant 
supposition that they had no intellectual predecessors, nor that they were 
launching an unprecedented “revolution in philosophy”, a fancy which on 
occasion gripped Austrian and British philosophers alike. They eschewed the 
Vienna Circle’s extreme and self-undermining critique of metaphysics, they 
never succumbed to French conventionalism or relativism, and they were never 
tempted by anything like ordinary language philosophy. Above all, they were 
epistemological realists and scientific optimists, even or perhaps especially 
those, such as Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden, who had encountered modern 
transcendental idealism in Husserl. Having their sources in two Austrian figures, 
one Bohemian, the other German in origin, both of whom were decidedly ‘anti-
Kantian’, Polish philosophy was never in danger of succumbing to 
transcendental – or any other kind of – idealism. To employ the bon mot of the 
Vienna Circle’s arch-historian, Otto Neurath, like Austrian philosophy in 
general, Polish philosophy was spared the Kantian interlude. 
In addition to its doctrinal fortune, Polish philosophy has been blessed – again 
by and following the example of its founder – with the virtue of expressive 
clarity. There is rarely any doubt as to what a Polish philosopher means. There is 
no striving for verbal brilliance or literary effect for its own sake, even though 
Polish philosophers can be eloquent and pointed in their writings. These virtues, 
and the intellectual solidity of its surviving members, enabled Polish 
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Czechoslovakia. International congresses and exchanges with such rising talents 
as Kurt Gödel, Rudolf Carnap, W. V. Quine and Karl Popper, as well as loose 
participation in the Unity of Science movement, brought Polish philosophy and 
logic into the mainstream of European analytic thought. Łukasiewicz found 
a kindred spirit in the first German professor of mathematical logic, Heinrich 
Scholz, and indeed fled Poland to Münster and Scholz during World War II. It 
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similarity between Tarski’s 1936 definition of logical consequence and the 
definition of logische Ableitbarkeit given by Bolzano in 1837. Tarski’s own 
attendance at a Unity of Science meeting at Harvard in 1939 literally saved his 
life, as he would almost certainly have ended his days in a Nazi death camp, as 
did most of his Jewish compatriots. Tarski’s friend and collaborator Adolf 
Lindenbaum, and his wife Janina Hosiasson (original author of the Raven 
Paradox of confirmation14) did indeed meet such a fate in 1942. In the unstable 
atmosphere of Summer 1939, Hosiasson had failed, by only days, to obtain 
a visa to depart on the same ship as Tarski to the USA.
The emphasis on logic in Warsaw was driven in part by the interests of the main 
actors there, but also in part by the rare collaboration with the Warsaw 
mathematicians, who understood that it was necessary to specialize in new 
subjects such as logic, set theory and topology, in order to avoid competing with 
the established mathematical nations of Germany, France and Britain in areas 
such as analysis and algebra. The result was to bring Polish philosophy 
somewhat closer to its Bohemian roots in Bolzano, whose combination of 
mathematical and philosophical talents was echoed among the Poles. The 
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continued, with essays by Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński and Łukasiewicz feeding 
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14 HOSIASSON-LINDENBAUM, J. [1940].
15 TARSKI [1933]. We now know, following investigation by Jan Woleński, that Twardowski 
materially assisted Tarski in getting Blaustein as translator, advising on the translation, and in 
smoothing the way to publication in German.
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epistemological realists and scientific optimists, even or perhaps especially 
those, such as Ajdukiewicz and Ingarden, who had encountered modern 
transcendental idealism in Husserl. Having their sources in two Austrian figures, 
one Bohemian, the other German in origin, both of whom were decidedly ‘anti-
Kantian’, Polish philosophy was never in danger of succumbing to 
transcendental – or any other kind of – idealism. To employ the bon mot of the 
Vienna Circle’s arch-historian, Otto Neurath, like Austrian philosophy in 
general, Polish philosophy was spared the Kantian interlude. 
In addition to its doctrinal fortune, Polish philosophy has been blessed – again 
by and following the example of its founder – with the virtue of expressive 
clarity. There is rarely any doubt as to what a Polish philosopher means. There is 
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philosophers to shrug off the challenge of Marxism–Leninism in post-Yalta 
Poland more quickly than in any other of the Soviet satellites. 
Polish philosophy today still flourishes. It has its own emphases, which continue 
those of the pre-war years, and it is rightly proud of its own past. It now 
fits seamlessly into the general analytic movement, and indeed serves as 
a welcome counterbalance to some of that movement’s more extreme 
excursions, whether into modal realism, monism, mereological nihilism, alethic 
relativism, Carnapian methodological insouciance or neo-Hegelian coherentist 
epistemology. This moderating influence echoes that of its interwar years. 
Where the Black and the White Przemsza rivers flow together, three Empires 
once stood. Now that minor confluence is internal to the Republic of Poland, and 
its historical significance almost forgotten. The streams of thought of Bolzano 
and Brentano are not minor, indeed they represent perhaps the two most 
scientifically significant systems of philosophy in the 19th century (which is not 
to say they are the most influential!) Their confluence in the thought of 
Twardowski, who for influence rivals Brentano, and whose career as a leader in 
philosophy started in Austrian Galicia, is highly significant. Twardowski’s 
judicious mixture of logical, ontological, psychological and historical 
considerations not only provided a firm and fertile basis for the development of a 
whole nation’s philosophy, but also, in my opinion, got the balance right as to 
how philosophy should properly be done. 
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